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INTRODUCTION
At the core of rights in the United States is the right to vote, and
while this right has long been held to be fundamental it is not equal
among all U.S. Citizens.1 The right to vote is not granted to some U.S.
Citizens depending upon what U.S. territory they reside in. This
distinction is based on the definition of United States in the Uniformed
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”), which
arbitrarily includes some U.S. territories while excluding others.
In Segovia v. United States, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
exclusion of former Illinois citizens residing in U.S. territories from
voting in federal elections. In Segovia, the court held that U.S. citizens
residing in U.S. territories do not have a fundamental right to vote in
federal elections. 2 Here, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”) and the Illinois Military Overseas
* J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; M.S., May 2017, Criminal Justice Administration, Mercyhurst
University; B.A., May 2015, Political Science, University of Mount Union. Thank
you to my family and friends who have always supported me, the University of
Mount Union wrestling team, Jack Locke, and my professors who have helped guide
me along the way.
1 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964).
2 Segovia v. U.S., 880 F.3d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 2018).
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Voter Empowerment Act ("Illinois MOVE”) did not equally protect
voting rights for six former Illinois residents. This decision led to the
disenfranchisement of former military members, and further limited
the right to vote for citizens living in U.S. territories like Puerto Rico. 3
In doing so the court used a rational basis analysis to uphold an
underinclusive distinction between citizens of similarly situated U.S.
territories that did not allow the Plaintiffs to receive absentee ballots.
This comment discusses the issues in Segovia and how the
Plaintiffs could have established that they had a fundamental right to
vote.4 The article first discusses voting throughout American history
and how it has expanded since over time. The discussion then focuses
on determining state citizenship, and how it relates to the right to vote.
Lastly, the comment focuses on how the Plaintiffs could have
established their right to vote as fundamental by arguing that they
were Illinois citizens.
History of the Right to Vote: Fundamental Voting Rights,
Strict Scrutiny, and Absentee Ballots
Voting has long been a fundamental right in America. 5 A U.S.
citizen must also be a citizen of a state in order to have a fundamental
right to vote.6 The Framers created a government where voting is a
vital aspect of the system, and the Supreme Court has a long held that
the right to vote is fundamental. 7 The fundamental aspect of voting is
inherent in the way the Framers formed the government. 8 James
Madison stated that “[t]he right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in

3

Id.
Id.
5 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964).
6 See U.S. Const amend. 14.
7 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964).
8 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
4
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Republican Constitutions.”9 And without the right to vote other
fundamental rights we hold dear are “illusory” because “the right to
vote freely [ . . . is] the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government.”10 Therefore, every person is granted one equal vote
“without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence
within a State.”11
A. Expansion Through Legislation and Amendments
The right to vote was not as thoroughly protected as it is today. In
the past, the right to vote worked as a privilege bestowed upon the
upper-class rather than a right belonging to the many. Accordingly,
throughout United States history there has been a continuous
expansion of the scope of the right to vote. 12 For instance, initially the
right to vote was limited to white property owners and based on a tax
payment requirement. 13 But over time, the several states, Congress,
and the Supreme Court have consistently sought to prevent the
narrowing of the right the right to vote.14 As a result, we have seen the
vast expansion of the scope of the right to vote over the past three
centuries.15 The first step in the expansion of voting rights was the

9

Yazmin Dawood, Symposium: The Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze:
The New Inequality: Constitutional Democracy and The Problem of Wealth, 67 MD.
L. REV. 123, 131 (2007).
10 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 555 n.28 (explaining “The Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twentythird and Twenty-fourth Amendments to the Federal Constitution all involve
expansions of the right of suffrage. Also relevant, in this regard, is the civil rights
legislation enacted by Congress in 1957 and 1960.”).
13 Richard Briffault, Review: The Contested Right to Vote, MICH. L. REV. 100,
No. 6, 1506, 1509-1511 (2002).
14 Id. at 1508-1509.
15 Id. at 1508.
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abolition of laws that limited voting to property owners.16 This process
was accomplished by each state individually eliminating property
ownership requirements. 17
Likewise, the U.S. Congress has consistently expanded voting
rights.18 Passing constitutional amendments in America is a difficult
process because “[a] proposed amendment must be passed by twothirds of both houses of Congress, then ratified by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the states.”19 Consequently, when an amendment is
passed it reflects a consensus view of the importance of the
enumerated right. And the United States has seven amendments that
concern the right to vote, illustrating that the right is uniformly valued
across the nation. 20
In 1868, this nation uniformly demonstrated the value of voting
rights by passing the Fifteenth Amendment which states that “the right
of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”21 Congress again expanded the right
to vote by passing the Nineteenth Amendment which states that “[t]he
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” 22
The U.S. again expanded the right to vote in 1971 by passing the 26th
Amendment which lowered the legal voting age from 21 to 18. 23
Additionally, Congress has passed an abundance of legislation
protecting the right to vote. 24 Much of this legislation is meant to
16 Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, The Evolution of Suffrage
Institutions in the New World, 65 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY, 891, 900
(2005).
17 Stanley L. Engerman Et Al., supra, note 16.
18 Stanley L. Engerman Et Al., supra, note 16.
19 U.S. CONST. art. V.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, XXI, XXIII, XXIV, AND XXVII.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
22 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
24 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
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prevent the infringement of the amendments illustrated in the
Constitution.25 For example, Congress ratified the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 by preventing states from enacting discriminatory voting
legislation.26 Congress has not simply protected the right to vote but
has also made voting as easily accessible as possible. For example, the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 allows voters to register to
vote when receiving and renewing their driver’s license. 27 Similarly,
Congress intended the UOCAVA to protect the right to vote for
citizens living abroad. 28
B.

Voting and Court Decisions

The Supreme Court has also stringently protected the right to
vote, recognizing that the right to vote is precious to the American
legal system and society. 29 The Court consistently holds that the right
to vote is fundamental and that any infringement is subject to strict
scrutiny.30 The Court has adopted the Framers view that voting was to
be a central aspect of the United States. After all, “no right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in [an] election,”
and “other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote
is undermined.”31 The United States Constitution does not permit any
“classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this
right.”32 And the Supreme Court has consistently held that “any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized.” 33 This is especially true with regards to
Equal Protection claims, as the Court has held that “because of the
25

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
27 Nat’l Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S. Code § 20501 et. seq. (1993).
28 Segovia v. U.S., 880 F.3d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 2018).
29 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
30 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
31 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
32 Id.
33 Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
26
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overriding importance of voting rights, classifications which might
invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully
confined where those rights are asserted under the Equal Protection
Clause.”34 Therefore, a court should subject any infringement of a
fundamental right to vote to strict scrutiny.
However, the right to vote is not fundamental for all U.S. citizens,
and a significant deviation from the strict scrutiny analysis occurs in
voting cases when claims are brought by U.S. citizens who are not
citizens of a state. For instance, in Igartúa v. U.S, citizens of Puerto
Rico sought the right to vote in the House of Representatives to
establish a Puerto Rican Congressman. 35 Even though citizens of
Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens, the court held that they do not have a
fundamental right to vote “since Puerto Rico is not a state and cannot
be treated as a state under the Constitution.” 36 In effect, the right to
vote is only fundamental for U.S. citizens who are also citizens of a
state.37
The Second Circuit also examined a variation of this issue. 38 In
Romeu v. Cohen, a plaintiff alleged that New York’s enforcement of
the UOCAVA violated the Equal Protection Clause when the state
refused to send him an absentee ballot in Puerto Rico.39 In Romeu, the
plaintiff, a former citizen of New York, felt that U.S. citizens living in
U.S. territories were not receiving the equal protection of their voting
rights compared to U.S. citizens living overseas.40 The court held that
34

McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (citing
Harpe r, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)).
35
Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010).
36 Id.; see also, Jones Act, Jones-Shafroth Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat.
951 (1917) (In the Jones Act of 1917 Congress granted U.S. citizenship to those
living and born in Puerto Rico).
37 See also U.S. Const. amend. 23 (stating that “For purposes of representation
in the Congress, election of the President and Vice President, and article V of this
Constitution, the District constituting the seat of government of the United States
shall be treated as though it were a State.”)
38 Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2001).
39 Id. at 125.
40 Id.
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there was not an equal protection violation, but rather it was simply
part of the cost of a person moving their permanent residence outside
of a state.41
Notably, the mere failure to receive an absentee ballot is not
subject to strict scrutiny because the right to receive absentee ballots is
not fundamental, the right to vote is. 42 For instance, in McDonald v.
Board of Election Comm’rs., the Court analyzed the constitutionality
of a statute that did not send inmates awaiting trial absentee ballots. 43
The Court however decided not to use a heightened scrutiny analysis
because the petitioner did not allege an infringement of the right to
vote, but rather alleged an infringement of right to receive absentee
ballots. The Court held that the there was nothing in the record
alleging that the “Illinois statutory scheme ha[d] an impact on
appellants' ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote. It is thus
not the right to vote that is at stake here but a claimed right to receive
absentee ballots.”44 The Court reasoned that it was possible the state
would allow the inmates to vote through other means.45 As a result, the
Court did not consider the issue as a violation of the fundamental right
to vote and used a rational basis analysis. 46
Since McDonald, the Court has dealt with a similar issue twice. 47
However, the McDonald decision simply evolved into a requirement
that the infringed party allege that their failure to receive absentee

41

Id.
McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
43
Id. at 806.
44 Id.
45 McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808 n.6 (1969). (“the
record is barren of any indication that the State might not, for instance, possibly
furnish the jails with special polling booths or facilities on election day, or provide
guarded transportation to the polls themselves for certain inmates, or entertain
motions for temporary reductions in bail to allow some inmates to get to the polls on
their own.”)
46 Id.
47 See O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512
(1973)
42
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ballots actually infringes on their right to vote. 48 For example, in
Goosby v. Osser the Court used a strict scrutiny test to consider the
constitutionality of a statute that refused to supply prisoners awaiting
trial with absentee ballots. 49 The Court chose to use a strict scrutiny
analysis because the petitioners stated that their requests to register
and vote by other means were denied.50 In O'Brien v. Skinner, the
Court again used a strict scrutiny analysis to deal with New York’s
refusal to supply certain inmates awaiting trial absentee ballots. 51 The
statute did not specifically deal with inmates but rather stated that
individuals could only vote via absentee ballot if they were
“unavoidably absent” from their county of residence. 52 Consequently,
those held in jail awaiting trial in a county other than their residence”
were able to vote by absentee ballot, but “persons confined for the
same reason in the county of their residence [were] completely denied
the ballot.”53 This violated the well settled principal that "if a
challenged statute grants the right to vote to some citizens and denies
the franchise to others, 'the Court must determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.'"54
Consequently, the O’Brien Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis
when holding that the New York statue unconstitutionally infringed
upon the right to vote.55

48

McDonald, 394 U.S. at 808.
Goosby, 409 U.S. at 513.
50 Id. at 522 (“Requests by members of petitioners' class to register and to vote
either by absentee ballot, or by personal or proxy appearance at polling places
outside the prison, or at polling booths and registration facilities set up at the prisons,
or generally by any means satisfactory to the election officials, had been denied.”).
51 O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 528-29.
52 Id. (citing N. Y. Election Law § 117 (1)(b) 1964).
53 Id.
54 O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 530 (1974) (Marshall. J., concurring).
55Id.
49
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Federalism & the Right to Vote: Domicile versus Residence
An individual residing in a U.S. territory may not have a
fundamental right to vote because a U.S. citizen’s relationship to a
state may present a constitutional difference of whether the right is
fundamental.56 As stated, the right to vote in federal elections is not
fundamental for all U.S. Citizens. 57 The fundamental aspect of the
right to vote is reserved for U.S. citizens who are citizens of a State,
even if they reside in a U.S. territory. After all, the definition of
‘reside’ in the Citizenship Clause aligns with the definition of
domicile, and that is the context in which courts use it.58 For this
reason, if an individual is domiciled in a state they are a citizen of that
state and their right to vote is fundamental.
This is inherent in the U.S. federalist system that reserves rights
to the states and the federal government; a system that protects
individuals’ fundamental rights against both State and Federal
conduct.59 This assertion is plainly supported by the U.S.
Constitution.60 The Federalist system was designed to place power in
the hands of the people in each state. 61 The Tenth Amendment states
that the powers not given to the federal government “are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people.” 62 And the Declaration of
Independence states that the power to govern derives from the people
giving their “consent to be governed.”63 The predominate way that
people give this consent is by voting, and the Constitution clearly
places this right in the hands of State citizens as well as U.S. citizens. 64
In fact, the only jurisdiction that is permitted to vote in federal
56

See Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010).
Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010).
58 See e.g., Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 649 (1878).
59 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
60 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, XXI, XXIII, XXIV, and XXVII.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
62 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
63 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 1 stat. 1 (U.S. 1776).
64 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, and XXI.
57
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elections that is not a state is Washington D.C., and even this required
the ratification of the Twenty-Third Amendment.65 Above all, the right
to vote was a state matter, before it was an aspect of national
citizenship.66
The fundamental nature of the right to vote for citizens of a state
is inherent in the U.S. Constitution, by allowing the people of each
state to vote for their own representatives.67 Article One of the U.S.
Constitution states that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen . . . by the People of the several
States.”68 And the Seventeenth Amendment further placed the right to
vote in the hands of State citizens by giving them the right to vote for
U.S. Senators opposed to electors.69 Thus, pursuant to the
Constitution the right to vote is fundamental for U.S. Citizens and
State Citizens.
Yet, determining State citizenship is a more complex matter than
expected. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause states that
“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens
of . . . the State wherein they reside.” 70 This text seems to assert that
State citizenship is granted based an individual’s residency, but that is
not the case. Within the judicial system the terms “domicile,”
“resident,” and “citizen” have become so intertwined that their
meaning within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment is difficult
to ascertain.71 This is due to several factors, but generally the term
reside refers to domicile as opposed to residence.
Firstly, the common definition of “reside” either explicitly refers
to domicile or coincides with its definition. For instance Webster’s
Dictionary defines reside as, “to dwell permanently or continuously[,
65

U.S. CONST. amend. 23.
Briffault, supra, note 13 at 1511.
67 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, Cl 1.
68 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, Cl 1.
69 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
70 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1870).
71 See O.R. Clark, Elections: Student Voting, CORNELL LAW Q UARTERLY,
Volume II, 223, 228 (1917).
66
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or] occupy a place as one's legal domicile.”72 The legal definitions of
these terms similarly relate residence with the definition of domicile. 73
Black’s Law Dictionary does not define reside but rather distinguishes
the terms “residence” and “legal residence.” 74 In Black’s Law
Dictionary the term residence coincides with the common definition in
Webster’s Dictionary. 75 At any rate the definition of “legal residence”
directs the reader to “domicile,” which Black’s Law Dictionary
defines as “a person's true, fixed, principal, and permanent home [. . .
or] the residence of a person or corporation for legal purposes.” 76
Accordingly, within the legal context the term reside refers to
domicile.
Even more, the meaning of reside is so convoluted because courts
often use the terms “residence” and “domicile” interchangeably. 77
“Residence may or may not demonstrate citizenship, which depends
on domicile.”78 But above all “the underlying distinction between the
concepts of domicile and residence remains: while a person may have
only one domicile, he or she may have more than one residence.”79
Within the context of the Citizenship Clause, courts may use the
terms interchangeably, but both terms use and meaning are consistent
72

“reside”. (2018). In: Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. [online] Available
at: http://www.merriam-webster.com [Accessed 12 Nov. 2018].
73 See Domicile, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
74 See Residence; & Legal Residence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
75 Residence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defines residence as
“The act or fact of living in a given place for some time”); “Residence”. (2018). In:
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. [online] Available at: http://www.merriamwebster.com [Accessed 12 Nov. 2018] (defined as “the act or fact of dwelling in a
place for some time[, or] the act or fact of living or regularly staying at or in some
place for the discharge of a duty or the enjoyment of a benefit”).
76 Domicile, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
77 See e.g., Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 649 (1878); Gavin J. Dow, Mr.
Emanuel Returns From Washington: Durational Residence Requirements and
Election Litigation, 90 W ASH. U. L. REV. 1515, 1516 (2013).
78 Heinen v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 671 F.3d 669, 670 (7th Cir. 2012); see
also id.
79 Grange Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 494 Mich. 475, 527 (2013).
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with the definition of domicile. 80 This has been the Supreme Court’s
interpretation since it decided a diversity jurisdiction issue in
Robertson v. Cease just a decade after the ratification of the
Citizenship Clause. 81 In Robertson, the Court, for the first time since
the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment dealt with determining State
citizenship for diversity jurisdiction. 82 The Court held that there was
nothing in the “language or policy” of the Citizenship Clause that
conferred jurisdiction based on mere residence in a state. 83 And the
Court stated that a Defendant’s residence was “insufficient to show his
citizenship in [a] State.”84 This is because residence alone cannot
confer that an individual had a fixed “permanent domicile in that
state.”85
When dealing with diversity issues courts look to domicile
instead of residence because domicile is akin to citizenship. 86 The
main reason for this distinction is that residence can be temporary, and
domicile is a fixed location. Generally, domicile can “only be changed
through a person‘s intention to acquire a new domicile, a person never
intending to make a permanent home elsewhere never loses his or her
original domicile, in spite of absence from a jurisdiction that can
stretch for years at a time.”87 Courts a analyze several factors when
determining domicile, such as: intent of an individual to return or
remain, property owned in the state, voting practices, and tax
records.88And the Supreme Court has frowned on the use of residence

80

Id.
Id. at 650.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 E.g., Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914).
87 Gavin J. Dow, Mr. Emanuel Returns From Washington: Durational
Residence Requirements and Election Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1515, 1518
(2013).
88 Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991).
81
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alone because it makes it easier to manipulate jurisdiction. 89 For
example, in Morris v. Gilmer a creditor changed his residence to
Tennessee in order to obtain diversity jurisdiction. 90 The Court held
that “a citizen of the United States can instantly transfer his citizenship
from one State to another, and that his right to sue in the courts of the
United States is none the less because his change of domicil[e] was
induced by the purpose.”91 However, the Court also held that for the
change in domicile to “constitute a change of citizenship” the change
in residence had to be accompanied with the intention to make it a
permanent residence. 92 As a result, the Court did not grant jurisdiction
as the creditor “had no purpose to acquire a domicil[e] or settled home
in Tennessee.”93
Domicile allows individuals who move around or have multiple
residences to decide their own citizenship. In Carrington v. Rash, the
Court struck down a statute that did not permit servicemen to vote in
Texas if they were not domiciled there before enlisting. 94 The Court
stated that Texas would only be permitted to implement reasonable
policies for “determining whether servicemen have actually acquired a
new domicile in a State for franchise purposes.” 95 Similarly, in Saenz
v. Roe the Court struck down a minimum residency requirement to
vote.96 The Court held that the Citizenship Clause allows people to
choose to be citizens of a state, not for states to choose its citizens. 97
And the Seventh Circuit has also supported this key aspect of
domicile.98

89

Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 329 (1889).
Id. at 329.
91 Id. at 328.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 329.
94 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965).
95 Id. at 96.
96 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999).
97 Id. at 511.
98 See Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991).
90
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Segovia: Standing Issue
In deciding Segovia, the Seventh Circuit considered three issues.
The first issue was whether the Plaintiffs, six former residents of
Illinois, had standing to bring their equal protection claim against the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(“UOCAVA”).99 The Court recognized that the UOCAVA was
enacted by Congress to “protect the voting rights of United States
citizens who move overseas but retain their American citizenship.” 100
The Act reserves the right of these citizens to receive absentee ballots
to vote in “general, special, primary, and runoff elections for Federal
office.”101 Under UOCAVA a U.S. citizen is permitted to receive an
absentee ballot from the last state they were domiciled, and they do
not need to have any intention to return to that state. 102 The Seventh
Circuit held that the Plaintiffs, do not have standing because their
injury is not “fairly traceable” to the government’s enforcement under
the UOCAVA.103
There are two aspects of standing. 104 First, to confer federal
jurisdiction in relation to Article III of the U.S. Constitution the
Plaintiff must allege an injury that would be remedied by the court
ruling in their favor. 105 Second, the court must determine whether the
plaintiff’s injury is “fairly traceable” to “the challenged conduct.” 106
The Plaintiff will not have standing if the injury “results from the
independent action of some third party not before the court.” 107

99

Id.
Id.
101 52 U.S.C.S. § 20301(b)(3) (2011).
102 52 U.S.C.S. § 20301(b)(3) (2011).
103 Id. at 388-389; see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013).
104 Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 388-89 (7th Cir. 2018).
105 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-499 (1975).
106 Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. 693 at 700.
107 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
100
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Traceability does not need to be direct, but rather must have a causal
showing.108
In Segovia, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court
and held that the Plaintiff’s injury was not traceable to the
governments enforcement UOCAVA. 109 This decision was based on
the definition of “United States” in the UOCAVA.110 The UOCAVA
defines United States as “the States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and
American Samoa."111 The court held that the UOCAVA does not
prohibit Illinois from providing residents of Puerto Rico, Guam, and
the virgin islands absentee ballots, but rather the Illinois statute does
that unilaterally.112
However, the court’s opinion lacks an in-depth discussion of
traceability. The court analogizes the standing issue in Segovia with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org.113 But the facts presented in Simon present constitutionally
different causality issues.114 In Simon the Court held that the injury-infact was not fairly traceable to the government enforcement of an IRS
ruling.115 The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted from an IRS rule
that offered hospitals a tax incentive for giving indigent patients
limited services.116 The Supreme Court held that there was no standing
because there was a lack of a causal relationship. 117 The Court
expressed that whether a hospital denied indigent patients could stem
from a number of factors that did not include the tax incentive. 118 As a
108

Id. at 44.
Segovia, 880 F.3d at 387.
110 Id.
111 52 U.S.C. § 20310(8) (2011).
112 Id.
113 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
109

52

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018

15

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 14

Fall 2018

result, “there was [not] substantial likelihood that victory in th[e] suit
would result in respondents' receiving the hospital treatment they
desire[d].”119
But, the Seventh Circuit’s use of Simon was in error because the
facts and issues presented in relation to standing were slightly outside
the scope of those in Segovia.120 The court attempted to compare the
third-party decision of local hospitals to Illinois refusing to send
absentee ballots to non-resident citizens. 121 This analysis is improper
for several reasons. First, in Simon, part of the reason the Court held
there was no causal connection was because a hospital could make the
decision to turn away indigent patients absent any consideration of the
tax incentive.122 Unlike the scenario in Simon, the decision not to send
absentee ballots to U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico directly stems
from the government’s enforcement of the UOCAVA, as the Illinois
statute must correspond to the federal one. 123 Also, there are over
5,000 hospitals in this country, and the causal aspect of the individual
decisions of each hospital is much more attenuated than the decision
of Illinois to enact Illinois Military Overseas Voter Empowerment Act
("Illinois MOVE").124 Second, unlike in Simon if the Plaintiffs in
Segovia won their claim they would have an immediate remedy to
their issue.125
Further, not allowing standing under the UOCAVA is
inconsistent with the doctrine of expressio unius, which asserts that
omissions should be understood as exclusions.126 It is not always the

119

Id.
See Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 2018); see also id.
121 Segovia, 880 F.3d at 389; see also Simon, 426 U.S. at 39.
122 Simon, 426 U.S. at 44.
123 See Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for Chi., 218 F. Supp. 3d 643, 646
(N.D. Ill. 2016).
124 Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, 2018, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATIONS
(February, 2018), available at https://www.aha.org/statistics/fast-facts-us-hospitals.
125 Segovia, 880 F.3d at 389.
126 See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 157 (2003).
120
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case that omissions are exclusions, but that is the case here. 127 The
UOCAVA does not mention equivalent U.S. territories such as the
Northern Mariana islands in the definition of the United States, and as
a result they have been permitted to receive absentee ballots. 128 The
UOCAVA not mentioning these similarly situated territories has
resulted in certain U.S. Citizens arbitrarily not being protected by the
UOCAVA.129 The result is that the UOCAVA does not provide nonresident U.S. citizens equal protection of their voting rights depending
on the territory they reside in. Consequently, the UOCAVA confers
standing because if there were changes to the UOCAVA the Plaintiffs
injury would be remedied. 130
In consideration of the above-mentioned issues, the causal
connection between the injury and the UOCAVA is enough to confer
standing. Non-resident U.S. Citizens are unable to vote in federal
elections because the governments enforcement of the UOCAVA
allows Illinois to refuse them absentee ballots. 131 The District Court
was correct that “Illinois is bound by the floor that the federal
defendants stress that the UOCAVA provides.” 132 And that if the
UOCAVA excluded “Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands”
Illinois would be required to provide the Plaintiffs with absentee
ballots, or if the UOCAVA specifically addressed American territories
the Plaintiff’s would be able to obtain absentee ballots.133 Therefore,
the Plaintiffs injuries are indeed traceable to the UOCAVA.

127

2015).

See Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777 F.3d 937, 945 n.6 (7th Cir.

128

52 U.S.C.S. § 20301(b)(3) (2011).
See 52 U.S.C. § 20310(8) (2011).
130 See Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for Chi., 218 F. Supp. 3d 643, 646
(N.D. Ill. 2016).
131 Id.
132 Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for Chi., 201 F. Supp. 3d 924, 937
(N.D. Ill. 2016)
133 Id.
129
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The Plaintiffs Should Have Argued that their Domicile is Illinois
So Their Right to Vote Would Be Fundamental
The second issue decided by the Seventh Circuit in Segovia
involved the narrowing of the fundamental right to vote. 134 The court
held that the right to vote is not fundamental for non-resident U.S.
citizens.135 As a result, the court used a rational basis test instead of a
strict scrutiny analysis. 136 The Seventh Circuit is correct that nonresident U.S. citizens do not have a fundamental right to vote because
that right is reserved to citizens of a state. However, whether that right
is fundamental depends on whether the individual is also a citizen of a
State. So, if the Plaintiffs were able to establish that they were
domiciled in Illinois they would have a fundamental right to vote, and
the Courts decision of standing would have been of little consequence.
Here the plaintiffs were “six United States citizens who are
former residents of Illinois and who now reside in Puerto Rico, Guam,
or the U.S. Virgin Islands, plus two organizations that promote voting
rights in United States Territories.” 137 The individuals were also
former military servicemembers.138 The Plaintiffs contended that their
denial of absentee ballots is a due process violation of Equal
Protection under the UOCAVA and Illinois Move Statute. 139 The Due
Process Clause protects life, liberty, and property. 140 “Liberty . . .
extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to
pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental
objective.”141 State legislation violates Equal Protection when “the
rights allegedly impaired are individual and personal in nature.” 142
134

Segovia, 880 F.3d at 389.
Id.
136 Id.
137 Segovia, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 652.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 339.
140 U.S. Const. Amend. 14.
141 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954).
142 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964).
135

55

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol14/iss1/3

18

Roby: I Might Stay Awhile: The Fundamental Right to Vote in a Residency

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 14

Fall 2018

Equal protection claims only require a strict scrutiny analysis when the
legislation in question “impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right."143 Under a strict scrutiny analysis a law which
infringes upon a fundamental right “is permissible only if it is
narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest."144
The UOCAVA and Illinois MOVE affect a fundamental right, but
not in the manner the Plaintiffs alleged. 145 The Plaintiffs were not
receiving the same protection of voting rights as those similarly
situated in territories like the Northern Mariana Islands. 146 Illinois
citizens have a fundamental right to vote regardless of their current
residence.147 It is within the plain meaning of the Fifteenth and
Nineteenth Amendment that “the right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State.”148 These amendments expressly specify the right in relation
Federal and State conduct. At the time of enacting these amendments
Congress did not consider the right to vote in respect to U.S.
territories, but rather just in regard to U.S. State citizens. And the right
to vote in federal elections is enumerated in the constitution relating to
States.149 For instance, the President of the United States is elected by
the electors from the several States, not U.S. Territories. 150 Even more,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives are both voted
upon “by the People of the several States.” 151 “Article I of the U.S.
Constitution alone “uses the term ‘State’ or ‘States’ eight times when
defining and outlining the House of Representatives.”152 The right to
vote for citizens of U.S. territories cannot be read into any of these
143

Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
Id.
145 Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 2018).
146 Id.
147 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1
148 U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
149 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, Cl 2.
150 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, Cl 2.
151 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2; U.S. Const. Amend. 17.
152 Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2010).
144
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constitutional provisions or amendments, as they specifically place
limits upon the federal government and the states. Thus, if this right
was further reserved to citizens in U.S. territories it would have to be
stated within the U.S. Constitution.
The Seventh Circuit held that although the right to vote is
fundamental that right is not fundamental for U.S. citizens who are
currently residing in U.S. territories. 153 The court cited one case to
support its assertion. 154 That case was a First Circuit case which is part
of a long line of cases that have consistently held that Puerto Rican
citizens and residents could not vote in federal elections because they
do not have a fundamental right to vote.155 In Igartúa I, the plaintiffs
alleged that the UOCAVA did not equally protect the right to vote for
Puerto Rican residents because those who formally resided in a state
were given the right to vote in federal elections while other Puerto
Rican citizens were not.156 The First Circuit used a rational basis test
in this case because Puerto Rican citizens do not have a fundamental
right to vote.157 Through this series of cases the plaintiffs sought the
right to vote in federal elections based on a number of different
arguments, but the conclusion is always the same. 158 Each Igartúa
court basis its decision on two keys reasons; (1) Puerto Rican citizens
do not have a fundamental right to vote, and (2) the right to vote in
federal elections is reserved to states and Puerto Rico cannot be
153

Id.
See Segovia, 880 F.3d at 389; see also Igartúa v. U.S., 626 F.3d 592, 595
(1st Cir. 2010).
155 Id.; see also Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2010);
Igartua-de la Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 2005) (Igartúa IV); Igartua-de
la Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (Igartúa III); De La Rosa v. U.S., 229
F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000) (Igartúa II); Igartúa de la Rosa v. U.S., 32 F.3d 80 (1st Cir.
1994) (Igartúa I) (Igartúa is a series of cases in which individuals brought several
claims and arguments attempting to establish their right to vote in Presidential
Elections and for a member of the House of Representatives as Puerto Rican
citizens).
156 Igartúa de la Rosa v. U.S., 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994).
157 Id. at 83.
158 See e.g., id. at 85.
154
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considered a state under the U.S. Constitution. 159 But, these cases
differ from the facts in Segovia for multiple reasons.
First, Puerto Rican citizens were attempting to establish their own
representatives in congress, and the right to vote for the President of
the United states, which is a right reserved only to states. 160 The First
Circuit stated that “since Puerto Rico is not a state, and cannot be
treated as a state under the Constitution . . . its citizens do not have a
constitutional right to vote for members of the House of
Representatives.”161 This presented a constitutionally different
question than the one presented by the Plaintiffs, as the plaintiffs were
exercising their right to vote as former Illinois residents, not citizens of
Puerto Rico.162 Second, in Igartúa I, the court plainly stated that
former state residents residing in Puerto Rico have the right vote in
federal elections. 163
The issue in Segovia more closely aligns with the abovementioned case of Romeu because like in Segovia, the plaintiff in
Romeu claimed that as former state citizen the UOCAVA did not
equally protection his right to vote.164 “Romeu [could not] vote for the
President [of the United States] in Puerto Rico because the existing
laws do not confer such a voting right on U.S. citizens domiciled in
Puerto Rico.”165 Yet, the Segovia court’s only mention of Romeu is a
159

See Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2010); Igartua-de
la Rosa v. U.S., 417 F.3d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 2005) (Igartúa IV); Igartua-de la Rosa v.
U.S., 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (Igartúa III); De La Rosa v. U.S., 229 F.3d 80 (1st
Cir. 2000) (Igartúa II); Igartúa de la Rosa v. U.S., 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (Igartúa
I).
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Segovia v. U.S., 880 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2018).
163 “[T]he Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act [ . . . ]
provides that United States citizens, including residents of Puerto Rico, who reside
outside the United States retain the right to vote via absentee ballot in their last place
of residence in the United States.” De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 (1st
Cir. 1994).
164 Id.; see also Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2001).
165 Romeu, 265 F.3d at 126.
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quote stating that granting the Plaintiffs voting rights under the
UOCAVA “would have created a distinction of questionable fairness
among Puerto Rican U.S. citizens, some of whom would be able to
vote for President and others not, depending whether they had
previously resided in a State.”166 But this fairness is embedded in the
system created by the U.S. Constitution. It may not be fair that states
have significantly greater rights than U.S. territories, but that is the
system created by the U.S. Constitution.
In turn, if the Plaintiffs in Segovia could have established that
they had a fundamental right to vote by presenting a constitutionally
different issue, that the UOCAVA and Illinois MOVE statute did not
equally protect the right to vote for Illinois citizens. The Plaintiffs
being former Illinois residents, while significant, did not award them a
fundamental right to vote. However, the Plaintiffs should have placed
stock in their former residency in Illinois and argued that although
they reside in Puerto Rico they consider Illinois their domicile, and are
therefore Illinois citizens. “[S]ince the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution the mere allegation of
residence in Illinois did not make such a prima facie case of
citizenship in that State.”167 The Segovia Court bases nearly its entire
decision on the fact that non-resident U.S. citizens do not have a
fundamental right to vote. 168 But if the Plaintiffs could have
established that their domicile was Illinois it would negate the fact that
residents of U.S. territories do not have a fundamental right to vote.
Along those lines, the Seventh Circuit has proved to be quite
lenient when considering whether an individual has an actual domicile
in a state. Take for example Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden.169 In
Galva, the Defendant, Heiden, alleged there was no diversity
jurisdiction because he and the Plaintiff were both citizens of Illinois.
But Heiden also had significant ties to Florida. 170 “Heiden had
166

Id. at 125.
Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1878).
168 Segovia v. U.S., 880 F.3d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 2018).
169 Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991).
170 Id.
167
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registered to vote in Florida, had taken out a Florida driver's license,
had stated in an application for a Florida tax exemption that he had
become [. . .] a permanent resident of Florida, and had listed his
Florida address as his permanent address on both his federal and
Illinois income tax returns.”171 However, while Heiden split time
between Illinois and Florida he only took these actions to shield
himself from Illinois tax law.172 In the end the court held that “this is
shady business but it cannot convert” the suit against Heiden, who is a
citizen of Illinois, into “a suit against a Floridian.” 173
Most individuals may lack the financial means to keep multiple
residences in different states, but as stated domicile is based on several
factors, and intent is the focal point. 174 Even if individuals like the
Plaintiffs vote and pay taxes in Puerto Rico, Guam, or the U.S. Virgin
Islands they can still prove that their domicile is Illinois.175 They must
establish that they never intended to change their domicile and they
have an intent to return. The UOCAVA does not require an intent to
return but this will be necessary in order to argue that they have a
fundamental right to vote. These facts will be specific to each plaintiff.
This article does not attempt to establish exactly how a person can
reside in a U.S. territory and be a State citizen, but rather provide that
if they are able to do so they have a fundamental right to vote.
If a plaintiff is able to establish state citizenship then the
UOCAVA would permit Illinois citizens residing in certain territories
the right to vote, but deny that right to the those residing in Puerto
Rico, Guam, or the U.S. Virgin Islands. This is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause that would be subject to strict scrutiny because the
plaintiffs would be an Illinois Citizens with the fundamental right to
vote. And this arbitrary distinction would almost certainly fail a strict
scrutiny analysis.

171

Id.
Id. at 731.
173 Id.
174 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999).
175 See Galva Foundry Co., 924 F.2d at 730.
172
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Although the concept of domicile is generally used in the context
of diversity jurisdiction the Supreme Court has also used domicile
when considering voting rights cases.176 As well, the point of a
diversity jurisdiction inquiry is determining which state an individual
belongs to, and that would be the same determination for considering
if a person has a fundamental right to vote as a State Citizen. 177
Since the Plaintiffs reside in Puerto Rico, the fact that they are not
permitted to vote in federal elections is because Puerto Rico does not
have any rights under the Constitution to participate in federal
elections since it is not a state. 178 But an Illinois citizen would not be
participating in elections on behalf of Puerto Rico, they would be
participating in federal elections based on their fundamental right as an
Illinois Citizens. This issue must be seen on its face not analyzed
based on decisions that present constitutionally different issues. 179 The
Plaintiffs in Segovia are qualified voters as Illinois citizens. The
UOCAVA protects the fundamental right to vote for Illinois Citizens
who reside in the American Samoa but does not equally protect that
right for Illinois citizens residing in Puerto Rico. The reason for their
exclusion is not justified by a “narrowly tailored” compelling
government interest. 180 The UOCAVA may have been enacted before
there was a change in the status of certain U.S. territories but these
changes have resulted in an unconstitutional enforcement. 181 Therefor
the UOCAVA would not satisfy the strict scrutiny test as its
176

Saenz, 526 U.S. at 508.
I am aware that in the future there may be issues with domicile for
jurisdiction and domicile for voting. But diversity jurisdiction has evolved to mainly
determine whether an individual purposefully availed themselves in the state. See J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 889 (2011).
178 See Igartúa v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 594 (1st Cir. 2010).
179 See Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2018).
180 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
181
The Seventh Circuit held that when UOCAVA and Illinois MOVE were
passed the Northern Marianas was a "Trust Territory” with less integration than
other U.S. territories, but now the Northern Marianas further resemble other US
territories and even have a non-voting delegate to the House of Representatives. See
Segovia v. U.S., 880 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2018).
177
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enforcement permits the unconstitutional infringement of the Illinois
Citizens fundamental voting rights.
Segovia: The Distinction Between American Territories is Not
Rational
The third issue the Segovia court considered was whether Illinois
MOVE was rational. The court erred in its rational basis analysis of
Illinois MOVE by placing more significance on potential political
ramifications opposed to the actual rationality of the statute. The court
in Segovia held that the rationality for Illinois MOVE is arbitrary now
but was not when it was enacted nearly 40 years ago. 182
The court reasoned that “while the distinction among United
States territories may seem strange to an observer today, it made more
sense when Illinois enacted the challenged definition.”183 The court
then discussed that when Illinois’ MOVE was enacted the distinction
that is now arbitrary was logical. 184 The court held that it is irrelevant
if the distinction between the Northern Marianas/American Samoa and
other U.S. territories is arbitrary because Illinois defines living in the
other territories as residing within the United States.185 The court
reasoned that if it were to hold the statute unconstitutional residents of
the Northern Mariana Islands would lose their voting rights, and some
Puerto Rican residents would be able to vote while others would
not.186 And therefore it is rational “for Illinois to retain the same
definition it enacted nearly 40 years ago.” 187
The court should not have based its decision on these
ramifications. The rational basis test asks whether “there is a rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate

182

Segovia, 880 F.3d at 390.
Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
183
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governmental purpose.”188 The Supreme Court has already held that
during a rational basis analysis "the constitutionality of a statute
predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be
challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to
exist."189 For instance, recently in Shelby County v. Holder, the
Supreme Court held that the coverage formula of the 1965 Civil
Rights Act was unconstitutional because of changed conditions. 190
Shelby County alleged that the coverage formula in the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 was facially unconstitutional. 191 When the coverage
formula was enacted it required jurisdictions that had “tests or devices
as prerequisites to voting, and had lower voter registration and turnout,
in the 1960s and early 1970s” to “obtain federal permission before
enacting any law related to voting.” 192 The Supreme Court previously
upheld the coverage formula as rational in 1966 because it “was a
legitimate response to the problem” of voter discrimination, and it was
initially only meant to last for five years.193 However, it had been
consistently reauthorized with no changes coverage to the coverage
formula.194 But in 2013, the Court used a rational basis test when it
held the coverage formula was unconstitutional because the legislation
did not make sense “in light of current conditions.”195 The Court stated
that the use of the formula was irrational because it was based on “40
year old data,” and Congress needed to “draft another formula based
current conditions.”196
Similarly, the rationality analysis of Illinois MOVE should be
concerned with the current operation of the statute not just whether it
188

Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 423 (2001).
U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
190 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
191 Id.
192 Id. at 539.
193 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966).
194 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 529 (2013) (In 2006 Congress
reauthorized the coverage formula for another 25 years).
195 Id. at 553-556.
196 Id. at 556-557.
189

63

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol14/iss1/3

26

Roby: I Might Stay Awhile: The Fundamental Right to Vote in a Residency

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 14

Fall 2018

was reasonable when enacted forty years ago. “There is no valid
reason to insulate” Illinois MOVE “merely because it was previously
enacted 40 years ago.”197 When Illinois MOVE was enacted the
Northern Mariana Islands was a trust territory, 198 a significant
distinction from U.S. territories like Puerto Rico because trust
territories are less intertwined with the U.S. government. 199 But the
Northern Mariana Islands has been a fully incorporated U.S. Territory
since 1986.200 The changed status of the Northern Mariana Islands has
resulted in Illinois MOVE violating Puerto Rican residents Equal
Protection rights. 201 And since this Equal Protection violation is based
on changed conditions that led to the statute arbitrarily distinguishing
between U.S. Territories the Seventh Circuit should have held that
Illinois MOVE was irrational and unconstitutional. 202
Also, the court should not have placed such significance on the
potential ramifications that may have been accompanied by granting
the Plaintiffs voting rights because the logic was circular. 203 The
Seventh Circuit held that holding the statute unconstitutional would
take away the right to vote for American residents living in the
American Samoa.204 This conclusion makes little sense in terms of an
Equal Protection Claim. Simply put, the court held that it is rational
for a statute to limit voting rights for U.S. citizens living in Puerto
Rico because to overturn the statute would limit the voting rights of
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203 See id.
204 (The American Samoa is not only included in the definition of United
States in UOCAVA but in the definition of United States in Illinois because in 1979
it was more similar to a foreign nation than an incorporated U.S. territory)
198

64

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018

27

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 14

Fall 2018

U.S. citizens living in the American Samoa. 205 Put differently, the
court could not remedy the Equal Protection violation of U.S. citizens
living in Puerto Rico because it may result in U.S. citizens living in
the American Samoa not being equally protected. The proper
conclusion to such a dilemma is that Illinois MOVE violates the Equal
Protection Clause and the legislature needs to remedy the issue based
on “current conditions.”206
Consequences: The Potential Issues of Voting in Puerto Rico
The Segovia Court was correct that the potential ramifications
from granting the Plaintiffs voting rights could lead to future issues
regarding voting and Equal Protection Claims. 207 Once some residents
of Puerto Rico have voting rights and others do not, the door is opened
for Puerto Rican citizens to bring an Equal Protection claim of their
own. And Puerto Rico is in a sort of purgatory when it comes to rights
in America: Puerto Rico wants the right to vote, but that right is
reserved to states; Puerto Rico also wants to be a state but does not
have any voting power to bring forth legislation in the U.S.
Congress.208 For the longest time Puerto Rico wanted its cake and to
eat it too: it did not want to be a state, but they still wanted voting
rights.209 But those rights are reserved to states, and Puerto Rico is
not.210 However, largely due to its 123-billion-dollar debt, Puerto Rico
now would like become America’s 51st state. 211 This is an issue
President Trump and Congress have not considered, likely due to
205
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Puerto Rico’s mounting monetary issues. 212 There is also no clear
procedure for how a U.S. territory becomes a state. 213 And while
Puerto Rico’s leaders have asked Congress for a process to statehood
they have largely been ignored. 214 So, if the Segovia court did grant
the Plaintiff’s the right to vote, the potential issues that the court
would have been faced with in the future would go far beyond just the
scope of voting rights.
That said, the Seventh Circuit may not have considered all these
issues when deciding Segovia, but the potential ramifications of the
decision were much more substantial than simply granting voting
rights. Yet, if a plaintiff is able to base their Equal Protection claim on
the distinction that they are a citizen of a State it may prevent these
issues because it would still uphold the general principle that the right
to vote in federal elections is one reserved to the states. 215
Conclusion
Voting in America is an integral part of our governmental system
and it is a cherished right among citizens. 216 The right to vote has seen
a continuous expansion since the ratification of the Constitution. 217 It
is also a fundamental right for most U.S. citizens. 218 Since the U.S.
Constitution clearly places the right to vote in the hands of the states, a
U.S. citizen only has a fundamental right to vote if they are also a
citizen of a state. 219 As a fundamental right any infringement of the
212
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right to vote is subject to strict scrutiny. 220 For those individuals who
are not citizens of a state that right is not fundamental, and it may be
subject to a less stringent standard of review when infringed upon. 221
And despite the phrasing of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause, state citizenship is based on domicile opposed to residency. 222
Consequently, if U.S. Citizens residing in a Puerto Rico, Guam, or the
U.S. Virgin Island would like to challenge the UOCAVA they should
allege an Equal Protection violation based on the assertion that they
are domiciled in Illinois, and as Illinois Citizens they have a
fundamental right to vote. 223 The argument that the UOCAVA does
not equally protect the right to vote of non-resident U.S. citizens has
been, and likely will continue to be struck down because only state
citizens have a fundamental right to vote. 224 The remedy may be
finding a suitable plaintiff who can allege domicile within a state, and
argue that as a State citizen they have a fundamental right to vote. And
since legislation like the UOCAVA and Illinois Move arbitrarily grant
the right to vote to an Illinois citizen living in the American Samoa it
would likely not pass strict scrutiny. 225 This could result in an
improved statute that properly addresses American territories. And it
would prevent courts from getting involved in the complicated
business of Puerto Rico statehood and voting rights. 226
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